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Commentary
Fernando Alvarez
First, as it is well known, the magnitude of
the decline in employment during and after the
past recession differs according to the data sets
used to measure it. The establishment survey,
which is the one used in the paper, shows a much
larger decline than the household survey does.
There are several differences in the design of the
two surveys, which can, in principle, account for
the difference in employment. The establishment
survey measures employment from payroll infor-
mation from a large number of firms, so it gives
an estimate of the total employment for a large
sector of the U.S. economy. The household survey
measures the employment status from a given
set of households, so it gives an estimate of the
employment/population ratio. One explanation
that has been advanced for the difference between
the two estimates is that, if population decreases,
it is possible that employment/population stays
constant and that total employment decreases.
Because population is measured accurately only
every decade, a decline in population may explain
part of the difference between the two estimates.
Indeed, it has been proposed that immigration may
have sharply declined during the recession and
the beginning of the recovery, as a consequence
of policies enacted after September 11, 2001. The
paper by Koenders and Rogerson uses Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filtered data for employment, which,
in principle, should remove slow-moving varia-
tions (such as the one in population) from employ-
ment. Nevertheless, it is well known that the HP
filter is much less accurate at the end points, so
one may be suspicious of its ability to remove a
I
would like to start my discussion with
some quotes from Ben Bernanke’s (2003)
speech about the behavior of employment
during the past recovery. In this speech
Bernanke thoroughly reviews the main features of
the data and several of the hypotheses advanced
to understand the sluggishness of employment
during the recovery.
I suspect that some of the recent expansion in
productivity is instead the delayed result of
firms’ heavy investment in high technology
equipment in the later part of the 1990s. Only
over time have managers learned how to organ-
ize their production and distribution so as to
take full advantage of these technologies...
[Productivity growth] has also enabled firms
to meet the demand for their output without
hiring workers.
...Although other explanations for the jobless
recovery...have played a role, in my view the
productivity explanation is, quantitatively,
probably the most important.
Bernanke’s interpretation, while not identical
to the one in the paper by Koenders and Rogerson
(2005), is very close: It emphasizes technology as
the driving force, as opposed to aggregate demand
fluctuations, and locates the seed of the sluggish-
ness of the recovery in the strength of the previous
expansion.
My discussion centers on a presentation of a
general equilibrium version of the model by
Koenders and Rogerson. Nevertheless, before
offering it, I would like to briefly mention three
other points.
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             change in the trend that happened in the past
three years of the sample. Additionally, the models
we typically write are in terms of employment/
population ratios, so it seems that, even though
the household survey may be noisier, its results
should be used or at least compared with the ones
for the establishment survey used in the paper.
My second comment is that the model focuses
on the (time-varying) cyclicality of firing. Never-
theless, recent studies by R. Shimer and R. Hall
document that firing is less cyclical than hiring.
While the paper recognizes this possibility, the
model is still one in which the variations are
mostly in firing.
My third point is related to the measurement
of the hypothesis of the paper: The strength of the
recovery after a recession depends on the length
of the expansion that precedes it. There are only
so many recessions in the United States after
World War II. Thus, I think it may be useful to
repeat the empirical exercise for the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries. Of course, business cycles
across these countries are correlated, but not per-
fectly so; thus, I think the international comparison
will add valuable information to the hypothesis.
A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
VERSION OF THE KOENDERS
AND ROGERSON MODEL
Here I describe a general equilibrium (GE)
version of the Koenders and Rogerson model (KR
hereafter). This GE version endogenizes wages and
interest rates. I first describe a “reduced form”
model, which I hope makes the main ingredients
of the theory easy to see. Then I show that the
reduced form is the outcome of a GE version of
the KR model.
Although the preferences and technology are
similar, there are two main differences between the
KR model and the model here. One difference is
that I consider a planner’s problem instead of a
market economy. The second difference is that I
allow heterogeneity in the cost of reorganization,
as explained in the next section. In the following
description, I keep their notation as much as
possible.
The way I converted their model into a GE
problem is by postulating preferences of the form
,
where Ct is aggregate consumption and nt is
employment. An increase in ε2 makes the house-
hold less willing to work, and hence they will,
everything else equal, end up producing less and
consuming less. In this sense, ε2 is a “demand
shock.” As in KR, there is a constant number of
firms in the economy. Let µ2t denote the beginning
period fraction of non-reorganized firms and µ′ 2
the next period value of this variable. The more
non-reorganized firms are in the economy, the
fewer reorganized firms are. A non-reorganized
firm incurs an extra fixed cost of production rela-
tive to reorganized firms. A non-reorganized firm
can become reorganized by incurring a costly
action that involves producing with a higher
marginal cost. The technological possibilities for
this economy are described by
where nt is the labor units required to produce Ct
units of the aggregate consumption if the number
of non-reorganized firms today is µ2t and its num-
ber next period is µ2t+1. The parameter φ > 0 meas-
ures the fixed cost, in terms of labor, that each
non-reorganized firm incurs. The function a gives
the marginal cost, in terms of labor, of producing
each unit of Ct. It is assumed that a(µ2t,µ2t+1) is
decreasing in µ2t+1 because reorganization is costly;
lowering µ2t+1 saves on the current costly action of
reorganization. It is assumed that a(µ2t,µ2t+1) is
increasing in µ2t, because non-reorganized firms
are less productive. The next section derives these
assumptions from a GE model that uses the same
technology as the partial equilibrium KR model.
Having described the preferences and technology
I consider the following reduced form planning
problem:
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functions g and n:
For the case of log utility (γ = 1) I obtain the
following: g is increasing in µ2 with a slope less
than 1, so that the dynamics are stable; it is
increasing in ε2, so at times of “high demand”
there is no reorganization and thus µ2 increases
more. n is given by
This decision rule balances two effects: Employ-
ment increases with the “demand” shock, ε2t (the
household is more willing to work and consume),
and also increases with µ2t because the reorgan-
ized firms have larger fixed costs.
I can now reproduce the main result in their
paper, explained in section 4.1. Consider an initial
value of µ20 that is low, reflecting that a long expan-
sion has occurred up to now. Consider an initial
condition for ε20 low enough, so there will be reor-
ganization and a subsequent increasing sequence
of ε2t, which is meant to imitate the impulse
response of a persistent shock. Then, µ2t will be
increasing and hence the path of employment
given by the optimal decision rule just described
will be u-shaped, with its lower point after the
lower point of ε2t—hence, the sluggish recovery
after a long expansion.
One point that differs between the GE and the
partial equilibrium versions is the characterization
of the conditions under which reorganization
does occurs in relation to the persistence of the
demand shock ε2. In the GE version of the model
with γ = 1, if ε2 is i.i.d., then g is independent of ε2.
This differs from the partial equilibrium version.
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empirically, they are similar. In the GE version
with γ = 1, the decision rule g is increasing in ε2
if the distribution of ε2t+1 is stochastically higher
when ε2t is larger. In other words, in the case of
persistent “demand shocks,” reorganization is
countercyclical. Hence, the GE version of the
model reproduces the key results sought by KR.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE
GE MODEL
I first describe the technology and preferences
of the GE model and then show that they imply
the reduced form introduced here—the a′ func-
tion—and that the optimal decision rules have
the properties previously described.
I introduce heterogeneity in the reorganization
cost, η –, as a way to smooth out the problem. In
each period there is a continuum of goods indexed
by i [ [0, µ –]. These goods correspond to three
types of firms. There are µi firms of each type for
i = 1,2,3. Type 1 goods are those of firms with low
idiosyncratic demand shock εs and labor require-
ment as. Type 3 goods corresponds to reorganized
large firms with high idiosyncratic demand shock
εl and labor requirement al. Type 2 goods corre-
spond to firms with high idiosyncratic demand
shock εl and labor requirements that depend on
whether they are reorganizing or not and on the
idiosyncratic reorganization cost, η –[ R+, assumed
to be drawn i.i.d. each period from a distribution
with cdf G. I anticipate that the form for optimal
policy is that those firms with η – < η –* will engage
in “organization restructuring” and those with
cost η – > η –* will not. I denote the output of those
that do reorganize as y2(η –) and the common level
of output of those that do not reorganize as y –
2. The
labor requirements of each type of firm are
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The law of motion of the number of firms of
each type is as follows. Each period, measure 1
of firms of type 1 enter, fraction λl of the existing
firms die, and fraction πe become type 2 firms, so
Fraction λl of type 2 firms die, and fraction G(η –*)
engage in restructuring, with πe of those restruc-
turing doing it successfully, so
.








for all t $ 0. Thus, without loss of generality, the
number of type 1 firms is constant (= µ –
1), as well
as the total number of firms (µ –), so that
(2)
and the law of motion of firms of type 2 is
(3)
Consumption, Ct, is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate
of a continuum of goods:
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where αi > 0 are the weights of the different goods.
The weight of each type is as follows: Type 1 has
weight αi = ε1, and type 2 and 3 goods have
weights αi – εl. This captures the higher demand
for type 1 and 2 firms in the partial equilibrium
model. Hence,
(4)
Now I can write the planning problem as
where y is the vector of output across firms,
,
and where the maximization is subject to the
definition of the aggregate consumption C (4), the
total labor requirement n (1), the implied value
for µ3 (2), and the law of motion for µ2 (3).
ANALYSIS OF THE GE MODEL
First I turn to the derivation of the reduced
form planning problem, and then I analyze the
optimal decision rules of the reduced form plan-
ning problem.
Let e(µ2,µ′ 2) be the value of cutoff point η –* so
that the law of motion implies µ′ 2 given the current
µ2. The function e solves
yy y y y = () () =
=
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Define ã(µ2,η –*) as the minimum employment
n needed to produce one unit of Dixit-Stiglitz C,
formally:
subject to
Using the first-order conditions of this mini-
mization problem into the objective function, it
can be shown that
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if η –* > 0 and that
if η –* > 0 and G′(η –*) > 0.
Using the definitions of ã(˙) and e(˙), define
the function a(˙), the marginal cost in terms of
labor of producing one unit of the aggregate con-
sumption, C, given that the current and future
states are (µ′ 2,µ2). Then function a is given by
It is immediate from the definition of a(˙) that the
reduced form planning problem is equivalent to
the planning problem.
Using the definitions of a, ã, and e,
which is what we assume in the reduced form
planning problem.
The reduced form planning problem makes it
easy to solve for aggregate consumption and labor,
conditional on the current state (µ2,ε2) and a
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the period utility of the reduced form planning
problem so that the only choice is µ′ 2. In the special
case of log preferences (γ = 1) this gives
I turn to the analysis of the effect of the
“demand shock,” ε2, into reorganization. In the
log case, the period return function is additively
separable in ε2 and µ′ 2. Thus if ε2 is i.i.d., then
g(µ2,ε2), the optimal decision for µ′ 2, is independ-
ent of ε2 and hence the amount of reorganization
and µ2 will be constant. This is to be compared
with the partial equilibrium analysis wherein the
i.i.d. case reorganization is countercyclical.
Assuming that –log(a(µ2,µ′ 2)) is concave in
(µ2,µ′ 2), the first-order conditions and the envelope
displayed below are sufficient for an interior
solution:
If the “demand shock,” ε2, is persistent in the
sense that the distribution of ε′ 2 is stochastically
higher if ε2 is larger, one can show that ∂V/∂µ2 is
increasing in ε2. This, in turn, implies that g(µ2,ε2)
is increasing in ε2. Thus, in the case where ε2 is
persistent (provided –log a is concave), reorgani-
zation is countercyclical. I have solved this model
numerically by making discrete the state space,
so that the numerical solution does not depend
on the assumption that –log a is concave. In my
numerical examples, I have confirmed that g is
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REMARKS ON THE GE MODEL 
I have analyzed a planning problem instead
of analyzing the decentralized equilibrium of the
model. The partial equilibrium KR model is one
of monopolistic competition. Given the Dixit-
Stiglitz specification that I am using, it is easy to
formulate the equilibrium problem corresponding
to the economy whose optimal allocation I have
analyzed. As is well known, the equilibrium
allocation differs from the solution of the planning
problem due to the effect of the mark-ups of firms
on prices, which end up reducing real wages and
output. One simple way to reconcile the decen-
tralized economy and the planning problem is
to consider a market economy with lump-sum
taxes used to finance a subsidy to employment
of ϕ/(ϕ – 1), which undoes the effect of the mark-
ups. Alternatively, I conjecture that the solution
of a modified social problem gives the allocations
of the decentralized equilibrium. The modification
consists of changing the parameter A in some of
the expressions for the return function of the
planning problem.
I believe that, given the question at hand, it
is advantageous to consider a GE model. Never-
theless, the simple model I consider here is defi-
cient as a model of business cycles. As the reduced
form social planning problem makes clear, it is
equivalent to a static model with productivity
1/a, except that productivity is endogenous. For
the case of log preferences, the model where a is
exogenous and random, employment, n, does not
depend on productivity. To see this, notice that
the conditional optimal decision rule is given by
n = A/ε2 + φµ2, so it does not depend on produc-
tivity 1/a directly. Also, the static model has large
variations in interest rates. Introducing capital,
as in the standard neoclassical growth model,
will solve most of these shortcomings.
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